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This paper attempts to account for current huge international income disparities by
incorporating the fact that modern growth begins at di¤erent points in time for di¤erent
countries. This di¤erence is due to di¤erent levels of barriers to capital accumulation.
There are three main results in this paper. First, modern growth begins in all countries
but sooner in those with lower level of barrier. Second, the path of income di¤erence
exhibits an inverted U-shape over time for countries that di¤er only in their levels of the
barrier. Third, given the actual beginning dates of modern growth of two countries, the
model can account for a signi…cant portion of the observed income di¤erence between
them.
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from conversation with John Knowles, Ichiro Obara, Stephen Parente, Randall Wright, Chun-Seng Yip, and
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11 Introduction
Long run economic data demonstrates three important development facts. First, countries
experienced stagnation for long periods and subsequently enter a modern growth regime, that
is, a sustained increase in per capita output, though at di¤erent points in time. This important
moment of a country is referred as its ”turning point” by Reynolds. Second, the income
di¤erences between the early and the later developers exhibits an inverted U-shape over time.
Third, some countries with similar turning points have experienced dramatically di¤erent rates
of economic development.
On the other hand, evidence shows a persistent factor 30 income di¤erence between rich
and poor countries for the period 1960-1985. Such persistency has stimulated a line of research
examining the implications of policy di¤erences on income along the balanced growth path
among versions of the neoclassical growth model.1 However, the …rst long run development
fact implies that for a country which has su¤ered long stagnation, its current poverty level
relative to a early developer is evidently not a phenomenon along the balanced growth path,
but at least in part a transitional one. The question, then, is why do countries have di¤erent
turning points, and what does this imply for the current income disparity?
In parallel with previous papers, this paper attempts to answer these questions by consid-
ering the implication of policy di¤erences. I build on the model of Hansen and Prescott (1999).
In their model, there are two technologies with exogenous technological improvement. The
Malthusian technology uses land, labor and capital, while the Solow technology uses labor and
capital only. The economy is in stagnation when the Solow technology is not used as popula-
tion growth will cancel out any increase in total output. It reaches its turning point when the
Solow technology is used and it starts to grow. It will then asymptotically converge to a Solow
balanced growth path.
I extend the Hansen-Prescott model by introducing polices which act as a barrier to dis-
courage capital accumulation in the Solow technology. In contrast to previous models, barriers
in my model not only lower the level of income along the balanced growth path but also de-
lay the turning point. Because of this second e¤ect, the income di¤erence between economies
with di¤erent barriers displays an inverted U-shape over time, and hence the model can also
account for the second development fact. More precisely, there is no income di¤erence before
1This literature generally focuses on policies that distort capital accumulation (Mankiw, Romer and
Weil(1992), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996), Parente, Rogerson and Wright (1999)), technology adop-
tion (Parente and Prescott(1994)), and level of total factor productivity (Hall and Jones(1998), Prescott(1998)
, and Parente and Prescott(1997)). See McGrattan and Schmit(1998) for a survey of papers on cross country
income di¤erences.
2the early developer reaches its turning point. Then, the income di¤erence …rst increases before
it decreases to its balanced growth path level. The income disparity generated by this model is
shown to be signi…cantly higher than the level along the balanced growth path, and this result
is robust to changes in parameters. To account for the third development fact, the model o¤ers
a story as follows: two economies initially are subject to the same barrier, and hence the same
turning point. Given the actual data on turning points, the sizes of barriers can be determined.
After the turning point is reached, the barrier is reduced in one economy. Now, it is not hard
to imagine the country with a signi…cant reduction in barriers will experience a development
miracle, and their income level with diverge drastically.
I consider two empirical case studies to illustrate the strength of this model as a development
model. These case studies are the development experiences of Africa and Japan. In both cases,
I am interested in their experiences relative to the UK which is the …rst country to experience
industrial revolution. In the case of Africa, I use the actual di¤erence in turning points between
Africa and the UK to determine the relative barrier in Africa. I …nd that the barrier that can
account for their di¤erence in turning points can also account for the path of income di¤erence
between them. Moreover, my model predicts relative income in Africa will continue worsen
even if its relative barrier remains unchanged. In the case of Japan, I show that its postwar
miracle experience is a result of reduction in barriers based on historical evidence. Moreover, I
also …nd that its slowdown during the 70s is not necessary a result of an increase in its relative
barrier as argued by Parente and Prescott (1994).
The transition from stagnation to modern growth has only recently received attention in
the literature. Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) develop a multiple equilibrium model. The
transition in their model requires an exogenous change in the return to human capital. Kremer
(1993) documents the long run population data and argues that the population growth rate
increases at low levels of income and then decreases when income is high enough. Based on these
ideas, Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil (1998), Jones (1999) and Hansen and
Prescott (1999) endogenize the transition from stagnation to modern growth. These models
di¤ers in several aspects regarding the driving forces of the transition to modern growth and
whether such transition is inevitable or not. This paper is closely related to Lucas (1999) which
studies the evolution of the relative income distribution by assigning turning points exogenously,
and …nds that the income inequality exhibits an inverted U-shape. I study the same issue but
with the turning point endogenously determined.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the three long run
development facts as a motivation for this paper. Section 3 presents the model. The model’s
implication for international income di¤erences are studied in section 4. Section 5 discuss the
3role of the population pro…le in the model. The actual data on turning points are used in
section 6 to confront the model with the data. A conclusion is given in section 7.
2 Motivation
This section documents three important long run development facts in the data. (1) All coun-
tries experienced stagnation for long periods and subsequently enter the modern growth regime
(sustained increase in per capita GDP), though at di¤erent points in time. (2) The income
di¤erence between the early developers and the later developers exhibits an inverted U-shape.
(3) Some countries with similar turning points have experienced dramatically di¤erent rates of
economic development since 1950. The data used in this paper are reported in Lucas (1998).








































Figure (1) demonstrates that per capita income for all …ve di¤erent regions in the world
had been stagnant before the 19th century and started to grow at di¤erent times for di¤erent
regions.2 This stagnation is not because the world experienced no growth in total output but,
rather because the increase in population o¤set the increases in output. The Malthusian theory
2Region I includes UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japan and Western Europe are region II
and III respectively. Region IV includes Latin America, Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. Finally, region V
includes Africa and Asia(except Japan).
4therefore describes those countries in stagnation very well. However, countries subsequently
start to leave this type of stagnation and enter the modern growth regime. For instance, …gure
(2) shows that the turning point (the time at which modern growth begins) for the UK is
around 1800 while the turning points for Japan and Africa are around 1900 and for China and
India Subcontinent are around 1950.3,4

























































































For the same group of countries, …gure (3) plots the GDP per capita ratio between the UK
and the rest of the group. The picture displays an inverse U-shape over time for most of the
countries.5 This pattern suggests that the income ratio will be much lower when the ”poor”
country is closer to its balanced growth path. This o¤ers an explanation as to why the income
disparity predicted by the balanced growth path approach is much lower than the observed
number in the data. The picture also reveals another interesting fact: countries which have
the same turning points can have dramatically di¤erent experiences. For example, Japan and
Africa both have turning points around 1900 while China and Indian Subcontinent both have
turning points around 1950 yet there is substantial divergence. Lucas (1993) documents the
3Africa includes all of Africa except Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Indian Subcontinent
includes Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan.
4These turning points are suggested by Reynold (1985).
5The increasing income disparity has also been documented by Pritchett (1997).
5same result for two very similar economies, South Korea and Philippines.6 Both countries had
about the same GDP per capita in 1960, yet the growth rate for Korea was about 3 times that
of Philippines for the period 1960-1988.


















The message from the data is: in order to understand the current income di¤erences, the fact
that countries have di¤erent turning points must not be overlooked. This raises both analytical
and empirical questions. Why do countries have di¤erent turning points? How important is
this in explaining the current income di¤erences? The answer suggested by this paper are:
(1) countries have di¤erent turning points because of di¤erences in policies that a¤ect capital
accumulation. (2) Di¤erences in turning points are quantitatively important in accounting for
current income di¤erences.
To proceed, I need a model that can determine the turning point endogenously. I choose to
use the model by Hansen and Prescott (1999) as asymptotically the model behaves the same
as a standard Solow model which has replicated the modern rich countries fairly well.
6As documented in Lucas (1993), the population, labor force, fraction of population in the main city, fraction
of labor in agriculture, and level of education are all similar for both countries in 1960.
63 The Model
Following the existing literature, I use barriers to capital accumulation as an explanation for why
countries are poor and, in the context of this paper, why modern growth begins later. Barrier
can take the form of taxes on investment goods, corruption or other institution factors that
increase the relative price of investment goods, which in turn discourages capital accumulation.
There are many ways to model it. I assume it takes the form of reducing the e¢ciency of
transforming forgone consumption goods into usable capital goods for next period.
3.1 The Economy
Technology Output in this economy can be produced using two exogenously growing tech-
nologies, the Malthus technology and the Solow technology. The Malthus technology features
constant return to scale in capital, labor and land. On the other hand, the Solow technology


















where Kit, Nit and Lit denote capital, labor and land used in technology i at time t = 0;1::::::;
°m > 1 and °s > 1 are the growth rate of the total factor productivity (TFP) for the Malthus
and Solow technology respectively.
Physical capital is assumed to depreciate completely each period.7 Land is a …xed factor.
Output of the two sectors are identical, and can be used either for consumption or investment.
Hence, feasibility requires:
Ct + Xmt + Xst = Ymt + Yst
where Ct is aggregate consumption, while Xmt and Xst are the aggregate investment in the
Malthus and Solow capital in period t:
Firms in each sector are assumed to behave competitively and rent all factors of production
from households. A representative …rm in sector j takes the wage rate and rental rates for
capital and land as given, and chooses labor, capital and land input to maximize pro…ts.
Max
Njt;Kjt;Ljt
Yjt ¡ wtNjt ¡ rKjtKjt ¡ rLtLjt j = m;s
7In the quantitative work carried out later a period will be interpreted to be 35 years, so this assumption is
empirically reasonable.
7s:t:(1) and (2)
Household Sector The population structure is that of a two period lived overlapping gener-
ations model with endogenous fertility. In the beginning of each period, the current old agents
give birth to young agents. The number of children they have depends on their living standard
when young. Letting Nt be the number of young agents in period t, and c1t be the consumption
level for young agents in period t, the population dynamics are given by:
Nt+1 = g(c1t)Nt
where g(:) is an exogenous function that will be speci…ed in more detail when the model is
calibrated.
In period 0, there are N¡1 old agents and N0 young agents. Each initial old agent is endowed
with
K0
N¡1 units of capital and L
N¡1 units of land. Young agents are endowed with one unit of
time, which they supply inelastically. Old agents are assumed to be unable to work. Young
agents make a consumption-saving decision by deciding how much land and capital to purchase.
An old agent receives income from renting land and capital to …rms and by selling land to the
next generation.8 The barrier, ¼; is modelled as discouraging young agent from investing in
Solow capital as follow. For every unit of consumption good that a young agent give up, he
can get one unit of Malthus capital by investing in Malthus sector, or 1
¼ unit of Solow capital
by investing in Solow sector. In equilibrium, ¼ will be the relative price of Solow capital goods
to consumption goods. In my international income comparison, ¼ is the main parameter varies
across countries.




s:t: c1t + xmt + xst + qtlt+1 = wt (3)
c2t+1 = rkmt+1xmt + rkst+1
xst
¼
+ (qt+1 + rLt+1)lt+1 (4)
where c2t+1 is an old agent’s consumption in period t + 1, xt and lt+1 are the young agent’s
investment in capital and land respectively, and qt is the price of land in period t: Assume a
CRRA utility function, u(c) = c1¡¾¡1
1¡¾
8More generally, if capital did not depreciate completely, the old agent would also sell capital to next
generation.
83.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Given ¼; N0;K0 and L, the total land of the economy, a competitive equilibrium for this
economy consists of sequences for t ¸ 0 of prices fqt;wt;rKt;rLtg; …rm allocations, fKmt; Kst;
Nmt; Nst; Lmt; Ymt; Ystg; and household allocations, fc1t;c2t+1;xmt;xst;lt+1g; such that:
1. Given the sequence of prices, household allocations solve the household’s utility maxi-
mization problem
2. Given the sequence of prices, …rm allocations solve the …rm’s pro…t maximization problem
3. All markets clear:
Ymt + Yst = Ntc1t + Nt¡1c2t + Ntxt
Nmt + Nst = Nt
Kmt + Kst = Kt
Lmt = L = Nt¡1lt
where Nt and Kt denotes the aggregate labor and capital in this economy.






3.3 Dynamics of the Model
The …rst issue I address concerns under what circumstances the two technologies will be op-
erated. Because land is always supplied inelastically, it is easy to see that in equilibrium it is
always pro…table to operate the Malthus technology9. This, however, is not necessarily true
for the Solow technology. However, I will show that for su¢ciently high TFP in the Solow
9Suppose rLt;rkt and wt are equilibrium prices such that the Malthus technology is not operated. Then
since land can only be used in the Malthus technology, there is an excess supply of land, which implies that
these prices cannot be an equilibrium.
9technology, it will also be operated. When the Solow technology is not operated, I call this
the Malthus-only economy. When the Solow technology is used, I say that the economy is in
transition.
I now proceed as follows. First, I characterize the Malthus-only economy. Second, I …nd the
condition for the Solow technology to be operated. Third, I describe the asymptotic behavior
of the economy.
3.3.1 Malthus-only Economy





















mt = ¹ymt (6)








mt = (1 ¡ Á ¡ ¹)Ymt (7)
where ymt and kmt are the output and capital per worker in this Malthus-only economy.
One can look for a balanced growth path in the Malthus-only economy. To do this, I need
to put some restrictions on the population growth function g(:): As the model is motivated to
reproduce the fact that output per worker is stagnant before the industrial revolution, g(c1t) is
chosen such that the population growth rate is the same as the growth rate of output along the
balanced growth path in the Malthus-only economy. I now show that the population growth
function g(:) can be chosen to ensure this. Letting ^ ym and ^ km be the stagnant levels of output
and capital per worker respectively, the Malthus production function implies:









Thus, along the Malthus-only balanced growth path, output per worker is stagnant if




g(c1) > g(c1m) 8c1 2 [c1m;c1m + ²] where ² > 0
which I henceforth assume.
Under this restriction, equations (1); (5); (6) and (7) together with the market clearing
conditions imply that, along a Malthus-only balanced growth path, aggregate output, capital,
the price of land and the rental rate of land all grow at the same rate as does population. The
wage rate, the rental rate of capital, output per capita, capital per capita, and consumption of
the young and old are all constant.
103.3.2 Transition
Given N0; I can choose K0 such that the economy begins on the Malthus-only balanced growth
path in period 0.10 Then one can determine when the Solow technology will be used.
Proposition 1 Assume the economy is on the Malthus-only balanced growth path in period 0.
The Solow technology is used when
t >
ln Am
As + lnB0 + µln¼
ln°s
(8)









Proof. First note that if the Solow technology were to be used, pro…t maximization implies















st ¡ rktKst ¡ wtNst












If both technologies were used, household utility maximization implies marginal rates of return

















Let ^ rm and ^ wm be the constant rental rate of capital and wage along the Malthus balanced




















= vm which implies K0 = [N
¹
0 L1¡Á¡¹vm]1=(1¡Á)





It follows that the Solow technology is …rst used in period t¤
¼, where t¤




As + lnB0 + µln¼
ln°s
Once the Solow technology is used, the output per worker starts to grow and this is precisely
when modern growth begins. In what follows I will refer to t¤
¼ as the turning point. Note that
the Solow technology is used independently of the relative size of °m and °s: Since the right
hand side of the equation (8) is just a constant, the Solow technology will be used at some
point as long as °s > 1. Therefore, the model predicts that modern growth is inevitable in all
countries, but that the time at which it begins depends on the level of barrier, relative level of
total factor productivity of the two technologies, input shares and initial quality of land, labor
force and capital. Note that the population growth function will not a¤ect the turning point
as it only takes e¤ect after consumption exceeds the level along the Malthus balanced growth
path, at which point the economy has already passed its turning point.














mt = rkmt (9)


















Note that, as implied by (9) and (10), when both technologies are operated, marginal products
are equated across technologies. This, together with the market clearing conditions, determines
the fraction of labor and capital being allocated to each sector (see appendix 1).
3.3.3 Solow-only Economy
Assume now that the Solow technology has a higher growth rate of TFP (°s ¸ °m). As
already noted, this condition is not necessary for the Solow technology to be used. However,
12given °s ¸ °m and g(c1t) ! g, one can show that the fraction of labor and capital devoted
to the Malthus sector will converge to zero (see appendix 1).11 Equation (11) then implies
that the rental rate of land relative to the price of output will also converge to zero.12 Hence,
asymptotically, the economy behaves the same as a standard Solow growth economy and will

















st = (1 ¡ µ)^ y¼st (13)
where ^ y¼st and ^ k¼st are the output and capital per worker along the asymptotic Solow balanced
growth path for an economy with barrier ¼.
Along the asymptotic balanced growth path, output and capital per worker grow at the
same constant rate. The Solow technology production function implies:





Thus, both output and capital per worker grow at the rate (°
1=(1¡µ)
s ¡ 1) along the asymptotic
balanced growth path: Equations(2);(7),(12) and (13), together with the market clearing con-
ditions then imply that output per worker, capital per worker, consumption per young and old,
and wage all grow at the rate (°
1=(1¡µ)
s ¡ 1):
The dynamics of the model, therefore, capture what the rich countries have experienced so
far. The economy starts o¤ with stagnant output per worker, modern growth then begin with
increase in labor being allocated to the industrial sector. Finally, the economy converge to a
balanced growth path.
4 International Income Di¤erences
Having understood the dynamics of the model for one economy, next, I turn my attention
to international income di¤erences. To use the model to account for international income
di¤erences, I consider two identical economies except their levels of barriers.
11Note that these are su¢cient conditions. The fraction of labor allocated to the Malthus sector converges to
zero in the computer simulations even when °s < °m as long as °s > 1.
12A test for this result should be compared to the value of farmland in the data, as land in this model is only
used for the Malthus sector. Hansen and Prescott (1999) documents that value of farmland relative to the value
of GNP has declined from 88% in 1870 to 9 % in 1990.
134.1 Analytical Results
With the CRRA utility function, the ratio of output per worker for two economies along the
asymptotic balanced growth paths can be derived.
Proposition 2 Assume °s ¸ °m and g(:) ! g: Consider two identical economies except their
levels of barrier, let ^ y¼ist denote the output per worker along the asymptotic Solow-only balanced









The proof consists essentially of showing that the ratio of the rental rate of Solow capital
in the two economies is equal to
¼1
¼2:(See appendix 2) This income ratio is the same as that of
the standard one sector barrier model.13
The interesting point of this model, however, is its implications for di¤erent turning points
as a result of di¤erent level of barriers. Proposition 1 implies two main analytical results.
Lemma 3 Industrial revolution is inevitable in both economies which means there is no absolute
poverty trap.
13By standard barrier model, we mean the following:





where 0 < ¯ < 1 and ct is agent’s consumption in period t:





where ° is the total factor productivity growth, Kt; and Nt are capital and labor inputs at period t.
The law of motion for capital is:
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt +
Xt
¼
where ± is depreciation rate for capital, and Xt is aggregate investment at period t. Feasibility requires:
Ct + Xt = Yt
where Ct is aggregate consumption at period t:
14Lemma 4 The relationship between their turning points t¤
¼1 and t¤













Thus, the turning point for a economy with a barrier ¼ times the other happens µ ln¼
ln°s periods
later. Note that a higher capital share for the Solow technology not only increases the income
di¤erence along the Solow balanced growth path, but also increases the delay of the turning
point for given value of °s. The intuition is as follow. The turning point is reached when the
Solow technology is used which implies the investment in Solow capital is positive. On the other
hand, the e¤ect of the barrier is to reduce investment in Solow capital. As µ increases, the role
of capital in the Solow technology becomes more important. Thus, given the TFP growth rate
for the Solow technology, a given size of barrier causes longer delay in turning point when µ is
increased.
4.2 Quantitative Results
4.2.1 Calibration and Computation
The economy with barrier equal to one is calibrated to match the development experience of
England before 1800 and the postwar development experience of the industrialized countries.
The year 1800 is taken as the time at which modern growth begins for the English economy, and
will map to my endogenously determined variable t¤
1: A period in this economy is interpreted
to be 35 years in real time, which as noted earlier, justi…es the assumption that capital fully
depreciates after one period. Agents in this economy will therefore live for 70 years and work
for the …rst 35 years of their life-span. The postwar period will therefore be interpreted as
t¤ + 5 in my model. The initial conditions, Am;As;L and N0 are set to be one arbitrarily.
Given N0, K0 is chosen such that the economy is initially on the Malthus-only economy.14 As
the calibration strategy is the same as Hansen and Prescott (1998), I will only brie‡y describe
what they did. Basically, the population growth rate for the pre-1800 period in the UK is
used to calibrate the productivity growth rate of the Malthus technology, and the relationship
between the population growth rate and the GDP per capita for the industrial economies is used
to calibrate the population growth function g(:): Finally, the postwar economic development
of the industrial economies is used to calibrate the productivity growth rate of the Solow
14See footnote (11).
15technology and the discount factor. To summarize, the parameters values are:
¾ µ ¹ Á °m °s ¯
1 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.03 1.52 1
A general pattern in the long run population data presented in Lucas (1998) can be sum-
marized by the following g(c1) function which is also similar to …gure II in Kremer (1993). The
population growth function is calibrated to the following with x1 = 2; x2 = 18 and m = 2
where m = 2 corresponds to a 2% average annual population growth rate.





The main issue in solving for the equilibrium in this model is to …nd the equilibrium price of
land. Given L;N0 and K0, the equilibrium price for land is solved using the shooting algorithm
described in Hansen and Prescott (1999).
4.2.2 Results
With the same calibrated parameters, I then simulate another economy with barrier equal to
4 as a benchmark case. Jones (1994) studies the Summer and Hetson data set and …nds that
the maximum relative machinery price to that of the US for the period 1960-85 is equal to 4.
More recently, using the same data set, Restuccia and Urrutia (2000) construct a panel for the
relative price of aggregate investment to consumption over the period 1960-85. They found
that the relative price di¤erences across countries are large. In particular, the ratio between
the average of the top and bottom …ve percent of the distribution of relative prices is 11.3 in
1960 and 6.5 in 1985. Therefore, I will also report the results of using higher values of ¼ later
in the section.
Figures (5) to (9) summarize the quantitative results for the case of ¼ equal to 4. Figures
(5) and (6) show that while the UK starts to allocate its labor and capital inputs into the Solow
16sector, the Solow technology is still inactive in the distorted economy. The …rst development
fact is replicated in …gure (7). It demonstrates that output per worker is stagnant and starts
to grow in 1800 for the UK and in 1870 for the distorted economy. The model predicts that in
1975, output per worker for the UK is 18 times higher than its level in 1765 while it’s only 7
times higher for the distorted economy.
The model also captures the second development fact. Figure (8) plots the corresponding
ratio of output per worker between the two countries. The model predicts that relative output
per worker will increase from one to a maximum of 3.2 before declining to its Solow-only
balanced growth path level of 2.5. This shape of the income di¤erence closely resembles the
data in …gure (3). Moreover, a bigger income di¤erence is obtained (a 26 percent increase)
relative to the balanced growth path level.
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18Figure (9) displays the average annual growth rate of output per worker for these two
economies. It is interesting to note that the growth rate is not monotone as it is in the
standard Solow growth model. In particular, the growth rate …rst increases and then decreases
until it reaches its balanced growth path level. The increasing growth rate is precisely what
motivated Romer (1986) to study increasing return to scale. It is interesting that this model can
produce such an outcome with two constant return to scale technologies. Given this shape of
growth rate, the inverted U-shape income di¤erence in …gure (8) becomes clear. As the barrier
delay the turning point for the distorted economy, the growth rate for the undistorted economy
starts to increase …rst and is therefore always higher than that of the distorted economy until it
reaches its maximum. Thus, the income di¤erence increases during this period. The maximum
income di¤erence is reached when the undistorted economy reaches its maximum growth rate.
Then, the income di¤erence starts to decrease when the growth rate of the undistorted economy
decreases while the growth rate of the distorted economy is still increasing. When the growth
rates for both economies decrease to their balanced growth path level, the income di¤erence
also decreases to its balanced growth path level.
Within the context of this model, income di¤erences across countries can be decomposed
into the di¤erences along the balanced growth path and the timing of transition. Table (1)
reports the results of allowing higher levels of barrier on these two components. It shows that
as the level of barrier increases, the maximum income di¤erence is increasingly higher than
the level along the balanced growth path. This is partly due to the increased delay of modern
growth. For example, when the level of barrier is increased from 8 to 16, the delay in modern
growth increases from 2 to 3 periods. Thus, the percentage increased in the income di¤erence
rises from 33% to 40%.
Table 1: Relative output per worker with capital share equal to 0.4
Barrier Delay Ratio (BGP) Maximum ratio Percent Increased
2 1 1.6 1.8 18%
4 2 2.5 3.2 26%
8 2 4 5.3 33%
16 3 6.3 8.8 40%
32 4 10 14.1 41%
64 4 16 23 44%
To address the factor 30 income di¤erences in the data, table (2) reports the corresponding
combination of capita shares and barriers that can generate maximum di¤erences of this mag-
nitude. It shows that by considering di¤erent turning points, the required size of the barrier to
19generate a factor 30 income di¤erence is reduced by 40 percent given a capital share equal to
0.4. The reduction holds true for other levels of capital share as well.
Table 2: Combinations of capital shares and barrier for factor 30 income di¤erences
Capital Share Delay Barrier (BGP) Barrier (Transition) Percent Reduced
0.33 4 900 500 44%
0.4 4 164 100 39%
0.45 4 64 40 37%
0.5 4 30 18 40%
0.55 3 16 10 38%
0.6 3 10 6.5 35%
Finally, I consider the exercise of increasing capital shares holding the level of barrier …xed.
Note that, to be consistent with my calibration procedure, °s and b have to be adjusted when µ
is increased. Note, therefore, that increasing µ need not necessarily increase the delay in modern
growth as noted in earlier section. Given the level of barrier equal to 4, table (3) illustrates that
the maximum income di¤erence is increasing higher than the level along the balanced growth
path for capital’s shares ranging from 0.33 to 0.6. In particular, when capital share is equal to
0.5, the delay in modern growth increases the income di¤erences by 45%.
Table 3: Relative output per worker with barrier equal to 4
Capital Share Delay Ratio (BGP) Maximum ratio Pecent Increased
0.33 1 2.0 2.3 15%
0.4 2 2.5 3.2 26%
0.45 2 3.1 4.1 31%
0.5 2 4 5.8 45%
0.55 2 5.4 8.1 50%
0.6 2 8 13 63%
Alternatively, some have argued that some countries are poor because there are barriers that
deter technology adoption which therefore lower the level of the level of total factor productivity
in the production function. Thus, an alternative way to incorporate barriers into this model is









20At a general level, these two types of models are isomorphic, in the sense that I can choose
barrier parameters such that they imply the same output per worker ratio along the balanced




where ¼1 and ¼2 are the barriers to capital accumulation and technology adoption respectively.
Then, the delay in turning point implied by these two models are the same and same quantitative
results apply.15
5 Population Pro…le
In this model, the shape of the population pro…le is calibrated using the relationship between
population growth rate and GDP per capita for industrialized countries. This shape of popula-
tion pro…le is summarized by three parameters, x1; x2 and m: It implies that population growth
per period …rst increases linearly from its Malthusian level to m when consumption per young
is x1 times its Malthusian level, then decreases from m to one when consumption per young
is x2 times its Malthusian level. In the computer simulation, I have assumed the population
pro…le is the same for both distorted and undistorted economies. My focus there is to study
the e¤ect of barrier holding other things constant. I …nd that the income di¤erence between
these two economies …rst increases, reaching a maximum equal to 3.2 (when barrier = 4), then
decreases to its balanced growth path level. In the sensitivity analysis (appendix 3), I …nd
that this result is sensitive to the change in m. In particular, it shows that when maximum
population growth rate is increased from 2% to 3% (m = 2 to m = 2:8) for both economies,
the maximum income di¤erence is increased from 3.2 to 3.5, a nearly 10% increase. In view of
this, it is of interest to see what the data has to say for the population pro…les for a broader
range of countries.
As shown in …gure (10), the data suggests that the shape of the population pro…le is similar
across countries but the peaks are very di¤erent. More precisely, the late developers have much
higher peaks than the early developers.
A question one may ask is why does the population growth rate increase during the early
development stage of an economy? One may think that this is solely due to the decline in
15The rental rate of capital will be very di¤erent for these two models because in the …rst model the barrier
increases the relative price of capital while in the other it only works through TFP. In particular, if rks(¼1) and











¾ = 0 However, if one could rede…ne the e¤ective capital to be ¼ks,
this di¤erence could be removed.


















mortality rate. However, as Coale (1979) has documented for the case of Europe, and Dyson
and Murphy (1985) have documented for the case of many other countries, the total fertility
rate was also increasing during this period. This increase in the total fertility rate can be
decomposed into changes in marriage behavior and changes in martial fertility. Wrigley and
Scho…eld (1981) provide evidence that in England, the marriage rate increased and age at …rst
marriage decreased during the initial stage of industrialization. Evidence from the demography
literature suggests that marital fertility was increasing during the early development stage
and that this increase is mainly due to changes in postpartum sexual abstinence and duration
of breast-feeding.16 In addition, Livi-Bacci (1997) shows that mortality levels at the early
development stage in developing countries are more or less the same as European mortality
rates. However, the fertility rates in developing countries considerably exceed European rates.
Hence, available literature suggests that the di¤erence in the peaks of population pro…les in
…gure (10) is due mainly to di¤erential fertility rates. Cultural, religious and policy di¤erences
that a¤ect the fertility decision are important for understanding …gure (10) while understanding
what accounts for these di¤erences is of interest in its own right, I will simply take these
di¤erences as exogenous.
Given this di¤erence in population pro…les, I now ask what is the implication of the model
if I allow the distorted economy to also have a population pro…le with a bigger m? Speci…cally,
the maximum growth rate for the distorted economy (¼ = 4) is increased to 3% compare to the
2% of the undistorted economy. As argued before, this change in the maximum growth rate
will not a¤ect the turning point. The result on income di¤erences is shown in …gure (11).
16See Dyson and Murphy (1985).
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The lower line in …gure (11) is the same as my …gure (8) which plots the income di¤erence
between two economies that are identical except the level of their barriers. The upper line
corresponds to case in which the maximum population growth rate in the distorted economy is
higher than the undistorted economy. The maximum income di¤erence is increased from 3.2 to
4 which is a 25% increase. Moreover, the income di¤erences from 1940 to 2045 have all been
increased by more than 20%. Therefore, the model con…rms our intuition that the di¤erence
in population pro…les between the early and the later developer is important in accounting for
their income di¤erences.
6 Applications
In this section, I consider two case studies to illustrate the strength of my model. These two
cases are Japan and Africa. They demonstrate two interesting and important development
facts: (1) the wide income disparities observed across countries and (2) the miracle experience
of those who are initially among the bottom. In the case study of Africa, I show that size of
the barrier that accounts for the delay in the turning point can also account for the long run
pattern and range of income disparities. In the case study of Japan, I …nd that the model can
generate both the miracle and subsequent slowdown in growth of income.
6.1 Application I: Africa
The long run data presented in Lucas (1998) shows that the UK’s income is only two times
higher than Africa in 1750 but increases to 14 times in 1990. Moreover, it also indicates that
the turning point for Africa is around 1900 as suggested by Reynolds (1985). In this section,
23I address the following issue: can barriers that account for the di¤erence in the turning points
between two economies also account for the whole path of their income disparities?
We learn from …gure (8) that this model can generate the pattern of increasing income
di¤erence for a given level of barrier in Africa. More importantly, the model shows that the







Assume that the values of all parameters except ¼ are the same for the UK and the Africa.
Speci…cally, µ = 0:5 and °s = 1:43: The value of µ is larger than the value in section 4. This
is in accordance with many authors, e.g. Parente and Prescott, who have argued that capital
share should be higher than the canonical values because of the mismeasurement issue.17 Then
the barrier in Africa relative to the UK must be between 5 and 9 to generate a three-period
delay. In what follows I assume that ¼ = 8 for Africa.
With this size of the barrier, the model predicts that the UK’s income relative to Africa
will reach a maximum of 12 in 2045 and then decrease to its balanced growth path level of
8. I use linear interpolation between the periods in the model to compare the model with the
data. Figure (12) shows that the model replicates the increasing trend of the income di¤erence
between the UK and Africa and accounts for around 70% of the income di¤erence in 1970 and
1980. This results is impressive. It basically says if we know the di¤erence in the turning
points, we can obtain a close replica of the world income distribution and make predictions
about future income disparities.
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17The choice of µ will mainly a¤ect the level of ¼ but not the main results.
24The above calculation assumed no di¤erences between the UK and Africa other than the
barrier. In what follows I analyze how incorporating other sources of heterogeneity may improve
on the model’s predictions. The …rst element I consider is initial conditions. As mentioned
earlier, even before the turning point of the UK, output per capita in the UK was almost
double it’s corresponding value in Africa. Assuming Africa and the UK the same capital to
output ratio, input shares and exogenous Malthus technology, the ratio of their outputs per
capita along the Malthus balanced growth path in the model is equal to (
lUK
lAfrica)(1¡¹¡Á)=(1¡Á)
where l denotes land per worker. I then choose the relative value of land per worker in the two
economies to match the initial income di¤erence.18 Figure (13) shows the model’s prediction
for this scenario. With this adjustment in initial conditions, the model now accounts for around
90% of the income di¤erence in 1970 and 1980.
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The second source of heterogeneity that I consider is di¤erences in population pro…les. As
seen in …gure (10) the population pro…les for Africa and the UK are quite di¤erent. Speci…cally,
Africa had a maximum population growth rate of 4% whereas the UK had a maximum level
of 1.5%. In order to assess the impact of these di¤erences, I set m = 4 for Africa according to
the calibration for the population pro…le described in section 4.2.1. Figure (14) shows that the
model implies a much higher income di¤erence for the period 1960-1990. Moreover, the model
predicts that if the level of the barrier in Africa relative to the UK remains unchanged, the
UK’s income relative to Africa will increase to 24 in 2045 before decreasing towards its balanced
growth path level.
To sum up, the case of Africa illustrates some interesting predictions of the model. First,
18Of course it is not literally land per person that matters, but rather e¢ciency units of land per person from
the perspective of the technology.
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the barrier that accounts for the delay in the turning point for Africa relative to the UK can
also account for 70% of the current income di¤erence. Second, in contrast with the standard
balanced growth path approach, the model predicts that income disparities between Africa and
the UK will continue worsen even if relative barriers are unchanged. Last but not the least, the
high peaked population pro…le in Africa implies the current income di¤erence will be doubled
in …fty years.
6.2 Application II: Japan
Japan is an interesting case study because of its distinctive miracle experience. Modern growth
began in Japan around the end of 19th century, 100 years later than the UK. However, Japan’s
GDP per capita exceeds that of the UK in 1990, only 90 years after its period of modern growth
began. This rapid rate of catch up can be seen in its soaring growth rate for the postwar period.
As shown in …gure (15), its GDP per capita growth rate is 7.5% for 1950-60 and 9.5% for 1960-
70, compared to a 2.5% for the UK for 1950-70. Subsequently, however, the growth rate in
Japan dropped to 3.5% for 1970-90.
Parente and Prescott (1994) provide one way to account for Japan’s growth experience in
the postwar period using the standard balanced growth path approach. They show that the
miracle in Japan corresponds to a reduction in the size of the barrier in Japan to be less than
that of the US, while the slowdown is associated with an increase in the size of barrier in
Japan to be greater than that of the US. In other words, Japan is converging to three di¤erent
balanced growth paths corresponding to the period before the miracle, during the miracle, and
the slowdown after the miracle.
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Instead of studying this postwar development as an isolated experience, I look at it as a
part of the long run economic development of Japan. I …nd that the slowdown of the Japanese
economy after its miracle can be obtained without increasing its level of the barrier. The
di¤erence in our results highlight the key di¤erence of my approach and the standard balanced
growth path approach in accounting for international income di¤erence.
As Japan also experienced a three-period delay compared to the UK, I assume the barrier
in Japan is equal to 8 along its Malthus-only balanced growth path. The historical record
suggests two episodes that signi…cantly lowered barriers in Japan. They are the Meiji Restora-
tion in 1868 which ended Shogunate Japan, and the postwar economic and institution reforms.
According to Yamamura (1977), the new Meiji government adopted policy to encourage the
absorption and dissemination of western technologies and skills, and help the growth of the pri-
vate industries. In particular, the fraction of workers employed in industry by both private and
public …rms have increased signi…cantly in 1907. Postwar Japan underwent many major reforms
such as introducing numerous tax-exemptions or tax-reliefs for investment; industry-…nancing
program; allowing the purchase of new foreign patents; dissolving the zaibatsu system19 and the
deconcentration of many zaibatsu subsidiaries; and trade liberalization.20 According to Ohkawa
and Rosovsky (1963), these reforms led to a steep rise in the rate of private investment, a rapid
decline in agriculture sector, an acceleration of the introduction new technologies, and a 38%
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.
19The ”zaibatsu” is referred to a relatively small number of family-dominated company systems holding assets
through large segments of the Japanese economy. These groups had become a major force in Japanese economic
and political life before the World War II.
20There are many sources for these reforms. For examples, Tsuru (1961), Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1963) and
Rotwein (1964).
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These reductions in barriers are also consistent with the data reported in Collins and
Williamson (1999) and Jones (1994). The plots in …gures (16) and (17) are based on the data in
tables (1a) – (2b) of Collins and Williamson (1999). Figure (16) illustrates two consistent facts
for Japan during the period 1750 – 1950. First, the price of capital goods relative to consumer
goods decreased drastically between 1875/79 to 1880/84 and remained fairly stable since then.
Second, the price of equipment relative to consumer goods fell by 63 percent between 1875/79
to 1880/84 and continued to fall steadily during the period 1880 – 1950. Figure (17) plots the
ratio of these relative prices between Japan and UK. The ratio of the relative price of capital
goods in Japan to the UK dropped drastically between 1875/79 and 1880/84 and remained
fairly stable until 1945. Similarly, the relative price of equipment in Japan to the UK dropped
by 32% between 1875/79 and 1880/84, then fell steadily to a ratio of 2 in 1910, and remained
fairly stable until 1945. This evidence supports the argument that the barrier in Japan was
reduced after the Meiji Restoration. According to Collins and Williamson, the relative price of
28equipment in Japan is 1.9 times that of the US in 1950. For the period 1960-1985, …gures in
Jones (1994) demonstrate that the relative price of equipment in Japan relative to the UK is
equal to 0.6. Therefore, the data also supports a further reduction in barrier for the postwar
period.
In view of these facts, we carry out the following calculation to simulate the experiences of
Japan. The size of barrier is set equal to 8 initially. In 1905 the size of the barrier is reduced
by half. As …gure (17) shows the ratio of relative equipment price between UK and Japan
is reduced by half in 1905. While I am not limiting my interpretation of the barrier to this
one dimension, I think this magnitude of reduction is at least a useful benchmark. Finally,
consistent with the evidence in the Jones (1994), I assume the barrier is reduced to 0.6 for the
postwar period. These changes in the size of barrier are assumed to be unexpected for the
household.
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Figure (18) shows the model’s predictions. As seen, the model predicts that Japan will
eventually catch up with the UK. There are two interesting points to note in …gure (18).
Firstly, the income di¤erence for the period 1875 to 1940 is fairly stable even if the barrier is
reduced by half in 1905. This is because the model predicts an inverted U-shape (see …gure (8))
for the time path of income di¤erences for a given level of ¼: Therefore, if the barrier is reduced
before the maximum income di¤erence is reached, it will only cause the income di¤erence to
increase at a smaller rate but not necessarily reduce it. This is an interesting property of the
model and is consistent with the …nding of Restuccia and Urrutia (2000) that the range of the
relative price of investment is decreasing for the period 1960-85 while the magnitude of income
di¤erences is not.
Secondly, it replicates the slowdown in GDP per capita growth rate in the data. To illustrate
29this point more precisely, I plot the average annual growth rate of output per capita in the model
in …gure (19). It displays both the miracle and the slowdown.21 As mentioned earlier, for these
to happen in the standard barrier model, the size of barrier has to be decreased and then
increased. In this model, we have seen that both the miracle and the slowdown can be obtained
without increasing the level of barrier. This di¤erence implies that two di¤erent interpretations
for the slowdown in Japanese economy. According to the standard barrier model, Japan was
converging to a di¤erent balanced growth path with a higher level of barrier compared to
the balanced growth path where miracle happened. According to my model, however, both
the slowdown and miracle are along the same development path. Intuitively, when barrier
is reduced, the economy jumps to a di¤erent development path. Thus a signi…cant enough
reduction will generate a miracle. After the jump, the economy will grow according to the new
development path.
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The model is consistent with the interpretation that the Japanese miracle is a result of the
economic reforms after the Meiji Restoration and World War II. In particular, the values of ¼
I choose have a clear interpretation in Japanese economic history. In contrast to Parente and
Prescott (1994), I do not need to resort to an increase in the level of the barrier to generate the
economic slowdown in Japan.
I close this section with a remark. Reynolds (1985) documents that turning points for
many countries have been associated with major political reform. In the context of this model,
political reform (a permanent reduction in the level of barrier) is not necessary to generate
a turning point, as shown in proposition 1. However, it can speed up the process of shifting
21The removal of barrier can only partly replicate the postwar miracle of Japan as the destruction of the
capital during the war is also an important factor.
30input from the Malthus sector to the Solow sector. Moreover, as in the standard barrier model,
it moves the economy to a higher balanced growth path. As shown by Japan’s example, the
political reform increases the growth rate signi…cantly.
7 Conclusion
Recent papers have interpreted the current factor 30 income di¤erences as a balanced growth
path result. This paper takes another perspective. I argue that this magnitude of income
di¤erences is mainly due to the fact that poor countries have only recently entered the modern
growth regime. Taking this into account, this model generates a much larger income di¤erence
compare to the balanced growth path approach for given level of barriers. It also replicates the
three long run development facts observed in the data, namely, (1) countries have all experienced
a period of stagnation and subsequently enter the modern growth regime at di¤erent points
in time, (2) the long run income di¤erences exhibit an inverse U-shaped, and (3) countries
with similar turning points can have dramatically di¤erent development experiences. I …nd
interesting results in the two case studies. The case of Africa demonstrates that the barrier
that can account for the delay in the turning point can also account for the path of the income
di¤erences. The case of Japan illustrates how the model can generate the postwar miracle and
slowdown along the same development path.
There still remain other interesting questions. We have seen from …gure (10) that population
pro…les are very di¤erent across countries, especially between those developed earlier and those
developed recently. While the population pro…les of these countries do not a¤ect their turning
points, I have shown in section 5 that they have signi…cant e¤ects on the path of the income
di¤erences between these countries. In this model, the di¤erence in the population pro…les across
countries are treated as exogenous while endogenizing this di¤erence is certainly an interesting
step. Doepke (1999) endogenizes the fertility dynamics for the Hansen-Prescott model I consider
here. By assuming countries have the same population growth rate at their common turning
point, he …nds that di¤erences in child labor restrictions and education subsidies can account
for the di¤erences in the speed of the fertility decline. However, the di¤erence in the peak of
the population growth rate in …gure (10) cannot be addressed in his model.
This model abstracts from the fact that home production (non-market sector) plays an
important role in the developing countries. Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000) extend the
standard barrier model to include home production. They …nd that the measured income
disparity along the balanced growth path increases signi…cantly if market and home produced
goods are close substitutes and the capital share of the home production technology is small.
31Incorporating home production in this model is expected to work in a similar way as in their
model.
Another interesting extension is to allow life expectancy to vary with income. Life ex-
pectancy is assumed to be constant in this model, while in the data, there is signi…cant im-
provement in life expectancy over time for every age level. It will be interesting to incorporate
the idea that the improvement in life expectancy at young age encourages investment in human
capital while that of the old age encourages investment in physical capital. This intuition is sup-
ported by the …nding in McGrattan and Schmitz (1998). They …nd strong correlation between
GDP per worker and capital to output ratio, GDP per worker and primary school enrollment,
and GDP per worker and secondary school enrollment in 1985 using data from Summer and
Hetson (1991) and Barro and Lee (1993). When life expectancy is assumed to depend on in-
come, the model can generate di¤erences in life expectancy, education and investment between
the poor and the rich countries using barrier as the only source of heterogeneity between them.
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35Appendix 1
Given qt¡1;Nt,L, and Ht ´ Nt¡1(wt¡1 ¡ c1t¡1) ¡ qt¡1L and the fact that Solow technology is
used, the fraction of labor and capital input allocated to each sectors can be determined as follow.












µ¹(1¡mt) + (1 ¡ µ)Ámt
Kst=
µ¹(Ht=¼)(1¡mt)
µ¹(1¡mt) + (1 ¡ µ)Ámt
Thus, the fraction of labor allocated to the Malthus sector satis…es the following implicit function:
g(mt;Ht;Nt) ´ ¼rkmt(mt;Ht;Nt) ¡ rkst(mt;Ht;Nt) = 0
It is easy to show that g(:) has the same sign as f(mt;Ht;Nt) which is de…ned as follows:
f(mt) = ¼
µDL












where D = Á
Á¹1¡µµ








µ(µ ¡ Á)(¡¹µ + Á(1 ¡ µ))A1t¡(1 ¡ Á ¡ ¹)A2t< 0
where A1t > 0 and A2t > 0 if mt > 0; and
f(1) = ¼
µDL













The last property follows from the condition for the Solow technology to be used. One set of su¢cient
condition for f(:) to be strictly decreasing are:
1. Capital share in Solow technology is at least as big as that of Malthus technology (µ > Á)
2. Labor share in Malthus technology is at least as big as that of Solow technology (¹ ¸ 1 ¡ µ)
3. Land share in Malthus technology is greater than zero. (1 ¡ Á ¡ ¹ > 0)
Given that f(0) is strictly positive, f(1) < 0 and f(:) is strictly decreasing, there is an unique
mt < 1 solves f(mt) = 0. Note that if °s ¸ °m and g(c1t) ¡! g, I must have mt converge to
zero.
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: With the CRRA
utility function u(:) = c1¡¾¡1






































As argued before, the price of land converges to zero as the economy converges to the Solow balanced




Let ° be the asymptotic growth rate of capital per worker along the Solow balanced growth path.
The total value of investment xt can also be derived from the …rm’s pro…t maximization condition





Let ^ rk¼; ^ y¼st; ^ k¼t and ^ w¼t be the constant rental rate of capital, output per worker, capital per worker












































37Appendix 3. Sensitivity Analysis
I examine the robustness of the shape of …gure (8) with respect to changes in parameters
of the model. These parameters are initial population, initial capital stock, quality of land,
initial TFP levels for the Malthus and Solow technologies, input shares for Malthus technology,
population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path, and the population growth
function g(c1).
Initial Conditions Figures (20) and (21) demonstrate that doubling initial population,
initial capital, quality of land and Am
As all have insigni…cant e¤ects on the shape of the income
di¤erence curve.
Input Shares of the Malthus Technology Conditioning on the fact that the input
shares does not a¤ect the turning points, changing both the capital and land shares of the
Malthus technology have an insigni…cant e¤ect on the income di¤erence. This is not surprising
given …gure (5); the economy is almost in a Solow-only economy three periods after modern
growth begins. Therefore input shares of the Malthus technology are not important in deter-
mining the income di¤erence along the transition path.
Population Growth Rate Along the Malthus Balanced Growth Path Doubling
the population growth rate along the Malthus balanced growth path from 0.3 percent to 0.6
percent will increase °m from 1.03 to 1.07. This will not have an e¤ect on the turning point
according to the equation (8). Moreover, °m does not enter into g(c1) when consumption is
more than double its Malthus steady level. And, …gure (7) illustrates that consumption is
doubled two periods after the transition. Therefore, °m is insigni…cant in determining the
income di¤erence once modern growth begins.
Population Dynamics I check the robustness of shape of income di¤erence by varying
x1, x2 and m. Figures (22) and (23) show that both x1 and x2 have an insigni…cant e¤ect on
the maximum income di¤erence but m has a signi…cant e¤ect. By increasing the maximum
annual population growth rate from 2% to 3% (m = 2 to m = 2:81), the maximum income
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